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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Eight p.m., New Year’s Eve 2013. Six-year-old Sophia Liu crosses the street
2
in San Francisco’s Tenderloin district with her mother and younger brother. A
3
4
gray Honda Pilot drives toward them. The driver looks down at his smartphone
and makes a right turn at a red light without stopping for the pedestrians in the
5
crosswalk. The driver strikes all three pedestrians, and Sophia dies at the
6
hospital from her injuries.
At the accident scene, the driver told police he was trying to find a passenger
7
on UberX, a smartphone application (app) that connects a person looking for a
8
ride with drivers for hire in the area. But the next day, Uber released a statement
that the driver “was not providing services on the Uber system during the time of
9
the accident.” Although Uber was required to have $1,000,000 worth of
insurance coverage for each accident that occurred when drivers were working,
the company refused to pay for the Liu family’s injuries because the driver did
10
not have a passenger at the time of the accident. The driver’s personal car

1. Andrew Dalton, Six-Year-Old Girl Struck and Killed in Tenderloin Crosswalk, SFIST (Jan. 1, 2014),
http://sfist.com/2014/01/01/7-year-old_girl_struck_and_killed_i.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Hearing on AB 2293 Before the S. Ins. Comm., 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) [hereinafter
2293 Ins. Hearing] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Huan Kuang, Sophia’s mother, as saying
the last thing she remembered was the smartphone illuminating the driver’s face).
5. Zach Miners, Parents Sue Uber over Daughter’s Death, Claim its App is Illegal, PC WORLD (Jan. 27,
2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2091920/parents-sue-uber-over-daughters-death-claim-its-app-is-illegal.
html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Dalton, supra note 1.
6. Carmel Deamicis, Uber Driver Hits, Kills Six-Year-Old Girl. Is “Not Our Problem” Still an
Appropriate Response?, PANDO DAILY (Jan. 2, 2014), http://pando.com/2014/01/02/uber-driver-hits-kills-6year-old-girl-is-not-our-problem-still-an-appropriate-response/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
7. An app is defined as: “[a] self-contained program or piece of software designed to fulfill a particular
purpose; an application, especially as downloaded by a user to a mobile device.” OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/app (last visited June 17, 2014) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
8. Jessica Kwong, Uber Driver Accused in Fatal Collision Told Police he was Awaiting Fare, S.F.
EXAMINER (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/uber-driver-arrested-for-vehicularmanslaughter-in-girls-death/Content?oid=2664123 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Barbara E.
Hernandez, Uber Seeks $500M; Company Valued at $12B, NBC SAN DIEGO (May 22, 2014, 3:51 PM),
http://www.nbcsandiego.com/blogs/press-here/Uber-Seeks-500M-Company-Valued-at-12B-260335051.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). “UberX” is the Uber corporation’s app in which regular people drive
clients in their own personal vehicles; “Uber” or “Uber Black” is the app that provides a user with a black car
and a driver who carries commercial livery insurance. Steven Gursten, What’s the Difference Between Uber
Black and UberX, and What are my Rights if I am Injured in an Uber Car Crash?, LEGAL EXAMINER (Mar. 28,
2014, 7:16 AM), http://detroit.legalexaminer.com/automobile-accidents/uber-black-uberx-rights-if-injured/ (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). “Uber” is often used to refer to both services. See id. (using “Uber” to
describe UberX and black car services).
9. Press Release, Uber, Statement on New Year’s Eve Accident (Jan. 1, 2014), available
athttp://blog.uber.com/ 2014/01/01/statement-on-new-years-eve-accident/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
10. Insurance Requirements for TNCs, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/
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11

insurance paid some costs, but under similar circumstances, a personal
insurance company could lawfully refuse coverage as most personal policies
have a “livery exclusion,” which allows insurers to deny claims that occur while
12
the driver is being paid to operate a personal vehicle.
Assembly Member Susan Bonilla introduced Chapter 389 to prevent
13
insurance battles like the one that followed the tragic death of Sophia Liu.
Chapter 389 helps close the insurance gap between the time when a driver for a
Transportation Network Company (TNC), like Uber or Lyft, opens the app and
14
when he or she picks up a passenger. Chapter 389 also ensures that the TNC’s
insurance policy or a policy the driver holds specifically for TNC activities
15
provides coverage instead of the driver’s personal policy.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In October 2012, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
determined that several ride-sharing companies were subject to regulation as
“charter-party carriers,” which are companies that charge a fee to transport
16
passengers, and ordered them to stop service. The CPUC made temporary
agreements with each company so they could continue operating until the CPUC
reached a final decision as to whether TNCs would be subject to charter-party
17
carrier regulations.
Enforcement/TNC/TNC+Insurance+Requirements.htm (last updated July 17, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Lyanne Melendez, Uber Sued for Wrongful Death of Six-Year-Old Girl in San Francisco, ABC 7
NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014, 6:17 PM), http://abc7news.com/archive/9408512/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
11. Patrick Hoge, Uber, Lyft, Hit by Proposed California Insurance Requirements, SILICON VALLEY BUS.
J. (June 11, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2014/06/11/uber-lyft-insurance.html?page=all (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that according to Uber, the driver’s personal insurance was
prepared to cover some of the damages, but the policy would have only paid $30,000).
12. See Memorandum, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., Notice to Transportation Network Company Drivers,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0250-insurers/0300-insurers/0200-bulletins/bulletin-notices-commissopinion/TransNetwkDrvrs.cfm (last visited June 1, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (A standard
livery exclusion generally states: “We do not provide coverage . . . arising out of the ownership or operation of
a vehicle while it is being used as a public or livery conveyance. This exclusion does not apply to a share-theexpense car pool.”).
13. See Patrick Hoge, Legislation Would Force UberX, Lyft, Sidecar to Provide Primary Driver
Insurance, S.F. BUS. TIMES (May 7, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2014/
05/legislation-primary-insurance-uberx-lyft-sidecar.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (illustrating
how the requirements of AB 2293 would have prevented Uber from disclaiming liability in the death of Sophia
Liu).
14. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5433 (enacted by Chapter 389).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 5360 (West Supp. 2014); Tomio Geron, Ride-Sharing Startups Get California Cease-and-Desist
Letters, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2012, 6:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/10/08/ride-sharingstartups-get-california-cease-and-desist-letters/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
17. Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to
the Transportation Industry, No. 13-09-045, at 2 n.2 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
Decision].
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California became the first state to implement regulations regarding ride18
sharing startups in September 2013, but the CPUC could not address all of the
19
issues with these companies without a legislative mandate. The CPUC dubbed
the businesses “Transportation Network Companies” and required TNCs to
20
obtain permits through the CPUC. In addition, the CPUC ordered each TNC to
buy at least a $1,000,000 commercial liability insurance policy to cover
“incidents involving vehicles and drivers while they are providing TNC
21
services.” This created several issues because the language was not clear and
liability policies are not comprehensive—they do not cover every type of
22
personal injury or property damage that may occur.
The first problem with the decision was that the CPUC failed to define what
23
driver actions might constitute “providing TNC services.” At least one TNC,
Uber, interpreted the phrase to mean while the driver is transporting a passenger
or after the TNC has matched a driver with a passenger, but not while the app is
24
merely on, which became evident after the death of Sophia Liu.
Another problem was that the liability policies the CPUC required would
only cover property damage or medical expenses of a third party in an accident
that the TNC driver caused, but not any injury to the TNC driver or damage to
25
his or her vehicle. Further, if an uninsured or under-insured driver caused the
26
accident, the TNC driver would not be covered under a liability policy. And, the
TNC driver’s personal policy would probably not cover any injuries or damage
that the TNC policy did not pay because most personal policies contain a livery

18. Id.; Tomio Geron, California Becomes First State to Regulate Ridesharing Services Lyft, Sidecar,
UberX, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/californiabecomes-first-state-to-regulate-ridesharing-services-lyft-sidecar-uberx/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
19. See Hearing on AB 2293 Before the S. Energy, Util., and Commc’n Comm., 2014 Leg., 2013–2014
Sess. (Cal. 2014) [hereinafter 2293 Energy Hearing] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (addressing the
fact that the CPUC’s power did not allow it to require Department of Justice background checks for TNC
drivers).
20. Decision, supra note 17. There are currently six TNCs licensed to operate in California. TNC Licenses
Issued, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/Enforcement/TNC/TNC_Licenses_Issued.htm
(last updated Oct. 13, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
21. Id.
22. Letter from Jennifer McCune, Attorney, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., to Michael R. Peevey, President, Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm’n (Jan. 10, 2014), available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/video/0030VideoHearings/upload/
CDI-CPUC20140110.pdf [hereinafter CDI-CPUC Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); What Does
Liability Car Insurance Typically Cover?, ALLSTATE, http://www.allstate.com/tools-and-resources/carinsurance/liability-car-insurance-cover.aspx (last visited July 10, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
23. CDI-CPUC Letter, supra note 22.
24. See Lyanne Melendez, Uber Sued for Wrongful Death of Six-Year-Old Girl in San Francisco, ABC 7
NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014, 6:17 PM), http://abc7news.com/archive/9408512/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (interpreting Uber’s statement that “[t]he driver was not providing services . . . [at] the time of the
accident,” to mean that he did not have a passenger).
25. CDI-CPUC Letter, supra note 22.
26. Id.
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exclusion, a clause that voids a driver’s personal policy if he or she drives for
27
payment, which exists in most personal policies.
28
In reaction to the issues with the CPUC decision, Assembly Members
29
introduced several relevant bills in 2014. AB 2068, introduced by Assembly
Member Adrin Nazarian, would have required TNCs to register as charter-party
carriers, meaning they would have to permanently mark their drivers’s cars and
30
procure the same insurance as other commercial transportation companies. Taxi
associations backed the bill as it would have required stringent regulations
31
identical to those imposed on taxi companies. A second bill that Nazarian
introduced, AB 2224, would have mandated that TNCs hold a primary
commercial liability insurance policy, similar to policies that taxi companies
32
carry, which would cover up to $1,000,000 per incident.
33
Both AB 2068 and AB 2224 died in committee. However, the bills’s
content found a second life when Nazarian “gutted and amended” AB 612, which
34
previously did not relate to TNCs. Initially, AB 612 would have defined TNCs
as charter-party carriers, required TNCs to regularly check its drivers Department
of Motor Vehicles records, imposed regular drug and alcohol testing on TNC
drivers, and ordered TNCs to purchase full-time commercial insurance
35
coverage. With its new subject matter, the bill underwent significant
amendments in committee, at which time the requirement for full-time
commercial insurance coverage and the designation of TNCs as charter-party

27. See id. (explaining that “[m]ost standard auto policies contain some form of an exclusion for livery”).
28. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (statement of Assembly Member Susan Bonilla).
29. AB 2068, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended on Apr. 24, 2014, but not enacted);
AB 2224, 2013–14 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2014, but not enacted); AB
2293, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014).
30. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5385 (West Supp. 2014); id. § 5391 (West 2010); AB 2068, 2014 Leg.,
2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended on Apr. 24, 2014, but not enacted).
31. See Allen Young, Taxi-Backed Bill Regulating Uber, Lyft Insurance Advances, SACRAMENTO BUS. J.
(Apr. 22, 2014, 5:37 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2014/04/22/taxi-backed-billregulating-uber-lyft-insurance.html?page=all (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Uber lobbyist
Will Gonzales as calling the bill “overkill” and “a very clear anti-competitive bill”).
32. AB 2224, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2014, but not enacted).
33. Complete Bill History of AB 2068, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_20512100/ab_2068_bill_20140428_history.html (last visited June 2, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Complete Bill History of AB 2224, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_2201-2250/ab_2224_bill_
20140428_history.html (last visited June 2, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. AB 612, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended on May 29, 2014, but not enacted).
When a bill is gutted and amended, the author “remove[s] the current contents in their entirety and replace[s]
them with different provisions.” CAL. ST. LEG., GLOSSARY OF LEGISLATIVE TERMS (last visited July 10, 2014),
available at http://www.legislature.ca.gov/quicklinks/glossary.html#G (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
35. AB 612, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended on May 29, 2014, but not enacted).
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36

carriers, like taxis, were removed. Despite the elimination of many of its
37
significant restraints on the TNC industry, AB 612 also died in committee.
38
Assembly Member Susan Bonilla introduced the final bill, AB 2293. The
39
governor ultimately signed the bill into law as Chapter 389.
While AB 2293 was moving through the legislature, the CPUC reopened
rulemaking to revise its September 2013 decision and proposed that TNCs
maintain $1,000,000 primary insurance policies that become active when a driver
40
opens his or her app. A further revision to the proposal in July 2014 required
$300,000 in excess commercial coverage when the app is open, but $1,000,000 in
41
primary insurance once the driver is matched to or is transporting a passenger.
Due to ambiguities in the CPUC’s proposal regarding the time at which TNCs’
insurance coverage needed to activate, as well as concern that the CPUC lacked
authority to issue regulations impacting personal injury law, Assembly Member
Bonilla believed it was important to continue moving her bill through the
42
legislature to provide definitive guidelines for the regulation of TNCs.
III. CHAPTER 389
Chapter 389 adds fourteen sections to the Public Utilities Code in order to
43
clarify and enhance insurance requirements for TNCs. First, it defines TNCs as
“provid[ing] prearranged transportation services for compensation using an
online-enabled application or platform to connect passengers with drivers using a
44
personal vehicle.” Next, it divides insurance requirements for TNCs into two
distinct periods of service: the time from which a driver accepts a passenger on
the app to the time the transaction is complete, and the period when the driver
45
opens the app and logs in, but the app has not matched the driver to a passenger.
To eliminate ambiguities that previously existed regarding the time at which
insurance coverage starts, Chapter 389 specifies that a primary insurance policy
providing $50,000 worth of liability insurance per injury, $100,000 in liability

36. Hearing on AB 612 Before the S. Energy, Util., and Commc’n Comm., 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess.
(Cal. 2014) [hereinafter 612 Energy Hearing] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
37. Carolyn Said, Calif. Ride-Insurance Bill May Pass; Background-Check Bill Dies, S.F. CHRON. (Aug.
27, 1014, 1:24 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/techchron/2014/08/27/compromise-near-on-calif-bill-on-insurancefor-lyft-uber-sidecar/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
38. AB 2293: DEFINING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY FOR TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES, FACT
SHEET (2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
39. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 5431–5443 (enacted by Chapter 389).
40. Hoge, supra note 11.
41. Proposed Decision of Commissioner Peevey Modifying Decision 13-09-045, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n July 10, 2014).
42. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Assembly Member Susan Bonilla).
43. AB 2293, 2013–14 Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); ASSEMBLY INSURANCE COMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2293, at 1 (May 7, 2014).
44. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5431 (enacted by Chapter 389).
45. Id. § 5433 (enacted by Chapter 389).
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insurance per incident, and $30,000 in liability insurance to cover property
46
damage must become effective when the driver logs in to the app. The TNC
must also provide a $200,000 liability insurance policy that would cover injuries
47
in an accident if the first policy is inadequate. The bill provides flexibility,
however, regarding the source of the primary policy: the TNC may provide the
policy, the TNC may require its drivers to purchase a commercial liability policy,
48
or the coverage may come from a combination of the two.
The TNC, the driver, or a combination of the two may purchase the insurance
policy covering the period beginning when the driver and passenger are matched
49
on the app. The policy or policies must provide $1,000,000 worth of coverage in
50
the event of death, injury, or property damage. The TNC must also hold a policy
with $1,000,000 worth of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that is in
51
effect any time a passenger is in a TNC driver’s car.
Chapter 389 makes it clear that if the driver’s policy is to provide coverage, it
52
must be written specifically for TNC services. During commercial operation, if
the driver’s insurance does not explicitly include coverage for TNC services, his
53
or her personal liability insurer does not have the duty to provide coverage.
Also, the personal liability insurer does not have to defend the driver if a claim is
54
brought against him or her nor indemnify the driver if liability is found. In
addition, if the driver’s commercial liability policy lapses, the TNC’s policy must
55
activate and provide coverage “beginning with the first dollar of a claim.”
Regardless of the policy’s source, the driver is required to carry proof of TNC
56
insurance coverage while driving for the company.
In the event of an accident, TNCs must provide data from the app to the
insurance companies investigating the accident under the requirements of
57
Chapter 389. If the driver was not logged in at the time of the accident, sharing
the fact that the driver was not providing TNC services will help clear up any

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The provision allowing the driver to provide the policy was added when it became clear insurance
companies were thinking of creating new types of personal policies that would include livery coverage. Meeting
with Sonja Palladino, Legislative Dir., Assembly Member Susan Bonilla, Chris Shultz, Deputy Comm’r, Cal.
Dep’t of Ins., and Robert Herrell, Legislative Dir. and Deputy Comm’r, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., in Sacramento, Cal.
(June 3, 2014) [hereinafter Meeting] (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review) (referring to Chris Shultz’s
comment that MetLife was working with Lyft and Sonja Palladino’s comment that they would not want to
legislate the opportunity for such a policy out of existence).
49. PUB. UTIL. § 5433 (enacted by Chapter 389).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 5434 (enacted by Chapter 389).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 5433 (enacted by Chapter 389).
56. Id. § 5442 (enacted by Chapter 389).
57. Id. § 5435 (enacted by Chapter 389).
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confusion for the driver’s personal insurance company and ensure the company
58
does not deny coverage under the livery exclusion when it should not apply.
Chapter 389 also obliges a TNC to disclose the details of its insurance
coverage and limits to its drivers, as well as alert its drivers that their personal
59
policies may not cover accidents while the driver works for the TNC.
Additional sections of Chapter 389 include the creation of a joint study of
60
TNCs between the CPUC and the California Department of Insurance, non61
disclosure requirements regarding the personal information of TNC passengers,
and statements of legislative intent, including (1) that the California Department
of Insurance must attempt to “expedite review” when insurance companies
propose new commercial liability policies to cover TNC activities, and (2) that
62
the CPUC is to continue its regulation of TNCs.
IV. ANALYSIS
Chapter 389 attempts to strike a balance among the interests of insurance
companies, TNCs and their drivers, consumer interest groups, consumer
63
attorneys, and taxicab drivers and unions. Stakeholders across several industries
collaborated with Assembly Member Susan Bonilla to create the solution to TNC
64
regulation found in Chapter 389. The group was diverse and composed of
organizations who are often adversaries, as the lawyer for Sophia Liu’s family
observed, saying, “when you see the insurance industry and consumer attorneys
65
working together, you know there’s a problem [with the law].” Chapter 389’s
66
balance, however, has not fully satisfied each side.
This section examines the arguments for and against Chapter 389, as well as
67
regulations that could be promulgated in the future. Part A explores the
provisions that TNCs say make Chapter 389 too onerous, while Part B looks at
the portions that cause taxi drivers to think that it does not sufficiently regulate
68
TNCs. Part C explores supporters’ reasons why Chapter 389 is an appropriate

58. Memorandum, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., AB 2293 (Bonilla)—Suggested Amendments and Recommendations
(June 3, 2014) [hereinafter CDI 2293 Memo] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
59. PUB. UTIL. § 5432 (enacted by Chapter 389).
60. Id. § 5436 (enacted by Chapter 389). The final report of this study is due Dec. 17, 2017. Id.
61. Id. § 5437 (enacted by Chapter 389).
62. Id. §§ 5438, 5441 (enacted by Chapter 389).
63. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (pointing to Assembly Member Susan Bonilla’s statement that
the “bill is very balanced”).
64. See 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (listing insurance companies, consumer attorneys, airports, and
Teamsters as supporters and stating that Uber and Lyft worked on a compromise).
65. Id. (quoting Christopher Dolan).
66. Infra Part A–B.
67. Infra Part A–D.
68. Infra Part A–B.
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compromise. Finally, Part D suggests TNC regulatory concepts that could be
70
expanded through future legislation or CPUC regulation.
A. TNCs View Chapter 389 as Over-Regulation of Their Industry
71

Uber says it “connect[s] riders to drivers.” Lyft will match a user with “a
72
friendly, background-checked driver from our community within minutes.”
Sidecar “matches everyday people in their own car with people nearby for shared
73
rides.” Wingz promises to “connect you with a super-hero local resident who
74
will drive you to/from the airport with their own car.” These companies
“connect” and “match” through apps, but insist that they do not provide
75
transportation. Each of California’s six TNCs considers itself a technology
company that drivers use to conduct independent activities, rather than a
76
transportation service, and resists being subject to transportation regulations.
TNCs are afraid that the costs associated with Chapter 389 will put them out
77
of business and prevent the evolution of the taxi industry. TNC representatives
78
argue that “unreasonable insurance requirements . . . will dampen innovation.”
Uber told its users that Chapter 389 “attack[s] the innovation that Uber has used
79
to revolutionize transportation.” In addition, politicians supporting the TNCs
fear that Chapter 389 could deter entrepreneurship and business growth within
the state because of the increased costs that higher insurance amounts would
80
impose on TNCs.

69. Infra Part C.
70. Infra Part D.
71. About Us, UBER, https://www.uber.com/about (last visited July 12, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
72. How it Works, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/how (last visited July 12, 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
73. Sidecar, AVALON VENTURES, http://www.avalon-ventures.com/investment/sidecar (last visited July
12, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
74. Ride to/from Los Angeles Int’l Airport, WINGZ, https://wingz.me/airport/lax (last visited July 12,
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
75. See, e.g., About Us, supra note 71 (stating Uber “connect[s] riders to drivers”).
76. See Liz Gannes, Why is Uber Fighting a Regulatory Battle that it Already Won?, ALL THINGS D (Oct.
24, 2013, 10:57 AM), http://allthingsd.com/20131024/why-is-uber-fighting-a-regulatory-battle-that-it-alreadywon/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining Uber’s position that the CPUC should not regulate
“technology companies”).
77. 612 Energy Hearing, supra note 36 (reflecting a comparison between TNCs and cell phones from
John Doherty, Vice President and General Counsel, TechNet).
78. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (quoting Robert Callahan, Executive Director, The Internet
Association).
79. E-mail from Uber California to its users (June 12, 2014, 8:34 AM) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
80. Gavin Newsom, Viewpoints: Don’t Stifle Innovation by Over-Regulating Uber, SACRAMENTO BEE
(June 16, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/06/16/6482456/viewpoints-dont-stifle-innovation.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
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These financial fears seem unsubstantiated, at least for the two largest
81
82
TNCs. Uber, for example, has raised over a billion dollars in capital. Other
TNCs with assets equaling just a fraction of Uber’s could feel more of a financial
83
impact due to the insurance requirements. It is likely, however, that TNCs will
place the burden to provide appropriate insurance on the TNC drivers, thus
84
mitigating costs to the companies. Five out of California’s six licensed TNCs
are examining hybrid commercial-personal insurance policies, which drivers
85
would purchase individually.
The most contentious portion of Chapter 389 for the TNCs is the requirement
to have $200,000 in excess insurance coverage prior to a passenger match; TNCs
think it is too onerous because they assert commercial activity only begins at the
time of a match, therefore they should not be responsible for a driver’s activities
86
prior to a match. TNC supporters also fear that statutorily setting the insurance
amount will make it too difficult to change if it is proven that the pre-match
87
insurance requirements are too high.
Currently, California law requires all drivers to carry a minimum of $15,000
in liability insurance per injury, $30,000 in liability insurance per occurrence, and
88
$5,000 worth of liability insurance to cover property damage. The insurance
89
industry commonly abbreviates this level of coverage as “15/30/5.” Even
though TNC drivers are subject to regulations beyond that of non-commercial
drivers, the TNCs initially argued that 15/30/5 personal policies should provide
pre-match coverage, even though those policies’ livery exclusions would
90
eliminate coverage.

81. See Hernandez, supra note 8 (hypothesizing that Uber is valued at $12 billion or more); see also Mark
Rogowsky, Are Investors ‘Nuts’ to Value Uber at $18 Billion? In a Few Years, That’ll Seem Like a Bargain,
FORBES (June 9, 2014, 7:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ markrogowsky/2014/06/09/are-investors-nutsto-value-uber-at-18-billion-in-a-few-years-thatll-seem-like-a-bargain/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(asserting that Uber has raised $1.2 billion in revenue).
82. Rogowsky, supra note 81.
83. See Yuliya Chernova, Facing Big Ride-Sharing Competitors, Sidecar Enlists Richard Branson, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/09/15/facing-big-ride-sharingcompetitors-sidecar-enlists-richard-branson/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing that Sidecar
raised over $15 million in its latest fundraising efforts).
84. See Carolyn Said, Hybrid Insurance for Uber, Lyft Drivers is on the Way, S.F. CHRON. (Nov 14,
2014, 5:17 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Hybrid-insurance-for-Uber-Lyft-drivers-is-on-the5894075.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the new types of insurance TNCs are
exploring).
85. Id.
86. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (quoting Sally Kay, Public Policy, Uber, who said the time when
drivers have the app on, but no passengers is “personal drivers in personal vehicles” and more than 15/30/5 in
coverage for that period is too much for “personal time”).
87. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (quoting Senator Jim Nielsen).
88. CAL. VEH. CODE § 16500 (West 2000).
89. Colleen King, Do You Know What 15-30-5 Means on Your Auto Insurance, EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 8,
2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/do-you-know-what-does-15-30-5-means-on-your-auto-insurance (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
90. See 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (discussing TNCs’ desire for 15/30/5 during comments from
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After negotiations commenced among TNCs, particularly Lyft and Uber,
Chapter 389’s sponsors, and Assembly Member Bonilla regarding Chapter 389,
TNCs agreed they could provide commercial liability insurance policies covering
91
a little over three times these amounts, or “50/100/30.” Even though limousines
must carry $750,000 of insurance protection per accident and taxicabs must have
92
up to $1,000,000 of coverage, TNCs rejected comparable requirements,
maintaining that they are technology companies and should not be subject to the
93
same insurance requirements before a driver-passenger match. They also did not
want to have to provide a large pre-match policy when there is no data to support
its necessity, although two TNCs, Uber and Lyft, voluntarily purchased
94
$1,000,000 liability policies to cover activities post-match.
When AB 2293 passed out of the Senate Insurance Committee, its
requirements for pre-match insurance would have cost TNCs approximately “30
95
to 35 percent more than” policies without coverage for that same period.
Although the legislature did not codify those higher conditions, TNCs still want
to reduce the effects of insurance requirements on their profits, and they believe
50/100/30 “represent[s] a compromise that protects public safety . . . and does not
stifle the new TNC transportation model that growing numbers of consumers find
96
convenient and affordable.”
TNC representatives also believe initiating insurance coverage when drivers
97
log into the apps does not reflect the apps’ real-world use. To them, business
98
begins when the app makes a match. They assert that drivers may leave their
apps turned on just to have commercial insurance coverage and to place liability
99
on the companies. If this is the case, then TNCs should not have to insure such
100
drivers during that time.
Lyft’s Director of Public Policy).
91. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (paraphrasing Sally Kay, Public Policy, Uber); SENATE ENERGY,
UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2293, at 6 (June 17, 2014).
92. PUB. UTIL. § 5391.2 (West 2010).
93. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (asserting livery requirements are inappropriate in testimony of Sally
Kay, Public Policy, Uber).
94. Id. (recounting comments from Lyft’s Director of Public Policy); CAL. DEP’T OF INS., INSURANCE
AND TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES: SOLVING THE INSURANCE CHALLENGES SO PASSENGERS,
DRIVERS, PEDESTRIANS, AND PROPERTY OWNERS ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED 2 (Apr. 1, 2014), available at
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/multimedia/0030VideoHearings/upload/TNCBackground.pdf
[hereinafter CDI REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
95. Ben Bergman, Proposed Insurance Rules Bad for Ridesharing Companies’ Bottom Line, KPCC (July
9, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/economy/2014/07/09/16986/proposed-insurance-rules-bad-for-ridesharingcompa/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting insurance broker Jerry Sullivan). The pre-match
insurance requirement at that point in the legislative process was a $750,000 liability policy. 2293 Ins. Hearing,
supra note 4.
96. SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2293, at 6 (June 17, 2014).
97. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (quoting Robert Callahan, Executive Director, The Internet
Association).
98. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (citing Senator Jim Nielsen’s comments).
99. SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
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TNCs have proposed several solutions that would solve what they perceive to
101
be problems with Chapter 389. First, they could self-regulate, purchasing the
amount of insurance they feel will appropriately shield their businesses from
risks, which Uber and Lyft say they already did when they purchased additional
102
uninsured motorist and collision insurance that is effective after a match. TNCs
assert pre-Chapter 389 regulations worked because personal car insurance
policies would pay for accidents prior to a match between a driver and
103
passenger. In fact, Uber asserts that an insurance gap did not exist in Sophia
104
Liu’s case because the driver’s personal insurance policy paid her family.
Second, the state could adopt legislation without the $200,000 excess policy
105
requirement, which is what the Colorado legislature did. That state’s TNC
legislation requires companies’s insurance policies to cover the time an app is on
106
prior to a match only if the driver’s personal insurance denies a claim. The
TNC’s policy must cover 50/100/30, but, like Chapter 389, the requirement is
satisfied if the driver secures a 50/100/30 policy specifically written to include
107
TNC services.
Finally, politicians have recommended more cost-sharing between the TNCs
and their drivers, where drivers would pay for the additional $200,000 worth of
liability coverage so that the insurance costs do not diminish the cash flow
108
needed to develop new technologies.
B. Taxi Drivers Want TNCs Subjected to Their Level of Regulation
Taxi drivers and unions do not agree with TNCs’ assertions that they are
109
merely technology companies. They contend driving is driving, whether apps
2293, at 5 (June 17, 2014).
100. See 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (paraphrasing testimony of Sally Kay, Public Policy, Uber).
101. See CDI REPORT, supra note 94, at 2 (noting TNCs voluntary expansion of insurance coverage).
102. Id. at 2 (explaining that “Lyft and Uber voluntarily close[d] some coverage gaps”).
103. Bergman, supra note 95 (quoting Jon Brooks, KQED).
104. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (quoting Sally Kay, Public Policy, Uber). Note that the driver’s
policy covered up to $30,000, but the Liu family sustained $500,000 in medical costs alone. Patrick Hoge,
California May Expand Insurance Rules for Uber, Lyft, et al., S.F. BUS. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014, 10:38 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2014/03/california-insurance-rules-uber-lyft.html?page=all (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review); David Stevenson, Critics Call Expanded Uber Insurance Policy ‘a
Sham’, KTVU.COM (Mar. 14, 2014, 7:25 PM), http://www.ktvu.com/news/news/ crime-law/critics-callexpanded-uber-insurance-policy-sham/nfDPF/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
105. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (quoting Sally Kay, Public Policy, Uber, as saying “Colorado has it
right”).
106. SB 125, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014).
107. Id.
108. See 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (noting Senator Ted Gaines’ comment that technology
entrepreneurs should not have to bear the cost of insurance and drivers can purchase $300,000 to $500,000
worth of coverage).
109. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (referring to comments from Barry Broad, Legislative
Representative, California Teamsters Public Affairs Council, and Barry Korengold, President, San Francisco
Cab Drivers Association.).
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110

are involved or not. TNC “services are no different than taxicabs” and they use
technology that taxi companies use, but with the benefit of investment capital to
111
popularize it. At the same time, taxi groups are not opposed to technological
innovation, but they want a “level playing field” where TNCs are not free to use
112
“unfair business practices.”
TNCs think $200,000 in additional insurance prior to a match is excessive,
113
but taxi supporters say it is not enough. Charter-party carriers—which include
taxicabs, limousines, and tour buses—are required to have between $750,000 and
114
$5,000,000 of commercial liability insurance based on vehicle capacity. Those
115
policies are in force at all times. Taxi drivers pay approximately $9,500 per
year to maintain their insurance policies and believe TNCs or the drivers should
116
have to do the same. They also say TNCs should be subject to the government
fees that taxicabs pay; if TNCs are not, the state will have reduced revenue from
117
transportation.
Anecdotal evidence of TNC drivers’ practices shows they do pick up
passengers on the street and solicit business while not using an app, despite
118
TNCs’ assertions. One taxi driver testified that on multiple occasions while off119
duty TNC drivers asked her, “Would you like a cab ride?” One member of
Assembly Member Bonilla’s staff successfully hailed multiple TNC drivers on
the street and after one ride she arranged through an app, the driver provided her
with his phone number so she could schedule a return ride without using the
120
app. These actions support taxicab drivers’s assertions that TNCs operate like
121
cabs.
Although taxicab companies, drivers, and unions generally want TNC drivers
to hold full-time commercial insurance policies, which is beyond the

110. Id. (indicating comments of Barry Broad, Legislative Representative, California Teamsters Public
Affairs Council).
111. Id. (quoting Barry Korengold, President, San Francisco Cab Drivers Association and incorporating
comments of Trevor Johnson, Director, San Francisco Cab Drivers Association).
112. Ted Morley, Briefing Report: When Tech Innovations Create Turf Wars, Do Consumers Win?,
CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS (Jan. 8, 2014) http://cssrc.us/content/briefing-report-whentech-innovations-create-turf-wars-do-consumers-win-2 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
113. Jon Brooks, Once Friendly Territory, California Looks to Toughen Rules for Uber, Lyft, NEWS FIX
(June 17, 2014), http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/06/17/2014/Uber-Lyft-Insurance-crack-down (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
114. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5391.2 (West 2010).
115. Id.
116. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (quoting Charles Rotter, San Francisco taxi driver).
117. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON TNCS, FACT SHEET (2014) [hereinafter TNC FACT SHEET] (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
118. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (citing comments of Barry Korengold, President, San Francisco
Cab Drivers Associatin).
119. Id. (quoting Beth Powder, San Francisco taxi driver).
120. Meeting, supra note 48 (quoting Sonja Palladino regarding her experiences with TNCs).
121. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (summarizing comments from Barry Korengold, President, San
Francisco Cab Drivers Association).
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requirements of Chapter 389, some have proposed different or additional
122
regulations for TNCs. Some have suggested deregulating the taxicab industry
or reducing the amount of insurance required to the same level enforced upon
123
124
TNCs. At least one TNC agrees deregulation could be a solution. Or, if
deregulation is too extreme, legislators or the CPUC could review taxicab
125
regulations, which have not been revamped since 1990.
San Francisco taxicab drivers would at least like TNCs to be held to the same
126
limitations that taxis in the city must follow. San Francisco sets rates for taxis,
including everything from amount per one-fifth mile to airport surcharges to
127
multiplication factors for trips outside the city. There are only 1,900 taxi
128
medallions in the city, yet there are anywhere from 3,500 to 6,500 TNC drivers.
Certainly, limiting transportation to 1,900 vehicles in a city with more than
825,000 residents would not be reasonable, but taxicab groups do not want TNCs
129
to grow unimpeded.
C. Insurance Companies and Consumer Advocates See Chapter 389 as an
Appropriate Compromise
California is not unique in its struggle to strike a balance in setting rules for
130
TNCs. Lawmakers in Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
122. See id. (indicating support for full-time coverage from Jeffrey Rosen, Vice President, San Francisco
Cab Drivers Association, and new regulations from Barry Korengold, President, San Francisco Cab Drivers
Association).
123. Id.
124. Carolyn Said, Wingz Gets PUC Green Light as Official TNC Provider, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 18, 2014,
6:06 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/techchron/2014/03/18/wingz-gets-puc-green-light-as-official-tnc-provider/ (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Geoff Mathieux, CEO, Wingz as saying, “[r]ather than regulate
the TNCs more heavily, we say deregulate the . . . taxis and the limos”).
125. 612 Energy Hearing, supra note 36 (attributing supportive comments from Senator Alex Padilla to
the industry); SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2293, at 3 (June 17, 2014).
126. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (referring to comments from Barry Korengold, President,
San Francisco Cab Drivers Association, that taxis cannot drive on certain streets on Friday and Saturday nights,
yet TNCs are unrestricted).
127. Taxi Rates, S.F. MUN. TRANSP. AGENCY, http://www.sfmta.com/getting-around/taxi/ taxi-rates (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
128. SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2293, at 5 (June 17, 2014).
129. Dan Schreiber, San Francisco at One Million: City’s Population Booming Once Again, S.F.
EXAMINER (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/san-francisco-at-1-million-cityspopulation-is-booming-once-again/Content?oid=2659836 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also
2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (observing that presently, there are no limits to the number of TNC drivers
on the road).
130. See, e.g., Uber Blasts Latest Round of Rules in Springfield, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (May 16, 2014),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140516/NEWS02/140519829/uber-blasts-latest-round-of-rules-inspringfield (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the Illinois legislature attempted to regulate
ridesharing by imposing rules analogous to taxi requirements).
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Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
131
Washington, and Wisconsin have endeavored to regulate TNCs. Some states,
like Pennsylvania and Virginia, immediately issued cease and desist orders to the
TNCs upon the start of their operations in order to have time to formulate
132
solutions. Other states, including Massachusetts and Utah, began negotiating
with TNCs, taxi companies, airports, and other interested parties without
133
quashing TNC service first. But, since California is home to the largest state
134
135
population, the most airports, and the Silicon Valley—birthplace of many
136
TNCs —most ridesharing companies operate in the state, extending the state’s
regulatory needs beyond those of other states that may only have Uber or Lyft
137
doing business in their largest cities.
As a result of California’s unique position, proponents of Chapter 389 had to
138
attempt to satisfy five licensed TNC companies; approximately 10,000 TNC
139
140
drivers; automobile insurance companies; taxicab drivers, companies, and

131. Don Jergler, Uber, Lyft, Sidecar Toe-to-Toe with Insurers State-by-State, INS. J. (June 27, 2014),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/06/27/332942.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); Al Vaughters, “Ridesharing” Could be Banned in Buffalo, WIVB.COM (May 14, 2014, 3:57 PM),
http://wivb.com/2014/05/14/ridesharing-could-be-banned-in-buffalo/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
132. Justine Coyne, Uber, Lyft Ordered to Cease Operations in Pittsburgh, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES
(July 1, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2014/07/01/uber-lyft-ordered-to-ceaseoperations-in.html?page=all (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Steven Musil, Uber, Lyft Hit with Cease
and Desist Orders in Virginia, CNET (June 5, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/uber-lyft-hit-withcease-and-desist-orders-in-virginia/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
133. See Martine Powers, Taxi Drivers say Uber Threatens Their Livelihoods, BOS. GLOBE (May 22,
2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/05/22/taxi-drivers-protest-uber-boston-offices/0YlRN0h
HAHVhcxFIQ2X5aI/story.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (proclaiming that a transportation task
force would assemble to address concerns from both TNCs and taxi companies); see also Robynn Garfield, Lyft
Ride Service in SLC Gaining Support, KSL.COM (May 14, 2014, 1:52 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148
&sid=29882791 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing a petition, directed at the city government
and airport ground transportation services, that asks that TNCs not be classified as taxis).
134. California Population 2014, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/
states/california-population/ (last updated Oct. 4, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
135. United States Airports, GLOBALAIR.COM, http://www.globalair.com/airport/state.aspx (last visited
Jan. 2, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
136. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (identifying Uber as a “California home-grown company”).
137. See TNC Licenses Issued, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/Enforcement/
TNC/TNC_Licenses_Issued.htm (last updated Oct. 13, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing
six licensed TNCs in California); see, e.g., Justine Coyne, Uber, Lyft Ordered to Cease Operations in
Pittsburgh, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES (July 1, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/
news/2014/07/01/uber-lyft-ordered-to-cease-operations-in.html?page=all (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (noting the two largest TNCs operate only in Pittsburgh).
138. See TNC Licenses Issued, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/Enforcement/
TNC/TNC_Licenses_Issued.htm (last updated Oct. 13, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing
six licensed TNCs in California).
139. Meeting, supra note 48 (referencing Chris Shultz’s comments regarding how many TNC drivers
exist).
140. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (including testimony from representatives of Association of
California Insurance Companies and Personal Insurance Federation of California).
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141

142

unions; managers of hundreds of airports; and the 39.3 million potential TNC
143
riders living in California. But, their ultimate goal for Chapter 389 was to
protect the public—including pedestrians, TNC and non-TNC drivers, the
companies themselves, and insurance providers—even if not every member of
144
the public agreed with their methods.
Assembly Member Bonilla and sponsors of AB 2293 have made it clear they
145
do not want to quell innovation with Chapter 389. They “support innovation,
but maintain that such innovation must be ‘responsible innovation,’ and must not
146
compromise the safety of the public.” Likewise, supporters do not want to pit
the taxis and TNCs against each other or use legislation to “pick winners and
147
losers among competitors.”
1. Supporters Stress the Importance of Pre-Match Coverage
Chapter 389’s proponents are committed to insurance requirements as soon
148
as a driver logs into a TNC app for several reasons. Despite TNCs’ claims, the
same business benefit exists when a driver is logged in to the app and when a
149
driver has a passenger. A TNC driver who has not yet been matched to a
passenger is analogous to a store that is open, has its sign lit, has products on its
150
shelves, but does not have any customers. The movement of cars on an app’s
map or the visibility of fuzzy, pink mustaches on Lyft drivers’ car grills as they
151
hunt for fares help to advertise the TNCs. TNCs have a business relationship
with their drivers and the transaction starts when a user looks at which drivers are
152
closest, so supporters say commercial coverage is required prior to the match.

141. See id. (referring to testimony from representatives of San Francisco Cab Drivers Association and
United Taxicab Workers).
142. United States Airports, supra note 135.
143. California Population 2014, supra note 134.
144. See 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (paraphrasing Senator Bill Monning).
145. Id. (noting Assembly Member Susan Bonilla); 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (quoting
Armand Feliciano, Vice President, Association of California Insurance Companies).
146. Letter from Armand Feliciano, Vice President, Ass’n of Cal. Ins. Companies, to Michael Peevey,
President, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter ACIC Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
147. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (quoting Senator Bill Monning).
148. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (indicating testimony from Kara Cross, General Counsel,
Personal Insurance Federation of California, who said not including pre-match activity defeats the purpose of
the bill).
149. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (quoting Robert Herrell, Legislative Director and Deputy
Commissioner, California Department of Insurance).
150. Id. (referring to comments by Robert Herrell, Legislative Director and Deputy Commissioner,
California Department of Insurance).
151. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (quoting Scott Wetch, Lobbyist, Carter, Wetch, and
Associates).
152. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (quoting Assembly Member Susan Bonilla).
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Defining “TNC services” as the time when the driver logs in to the app until
153
he or she logs out actually protects the TNCs with a bright-line rule. Under
Chapter 389, TNCs will no longer be subject to needless, post-accident lawsuits
that occur when it is unclear whose insurance policy will cover what injuries,
154
which happened before Chapter 389’s enactment.
Chapter 389’s sponsors say that as soon as the driver logs on, “the TNC
driver conveys to potential customers that he or she is available for business,
drives a little faster to the destination of potential customers, increases the
likelihood of distracted driving . . . and travels to places that may be . . . riskier
155
like a ‘beer fest.’” During a committee meeting, Senator Jerry Hill used the
UberX app on his phone to watch nearby drivers circle around the Capitol
156
building. The constant movement of available drivers made it clear to him that
drivers were searching for passengers, instead of safely parked, and were likely
157
distracted while searching. Since it is possible that the pre-match period is even
more unsafe than when a driver is on the way to a passenger or is driving a
158
passenger, Chapter 389 will help protect drivers, passengers, and TNCs.
2. Pre-Match Insurance Requirements Can Change with Future Legislation
TNCs have fought app-on, pre-match insurance requirements due to lack of
data showing the need for such insurance, yet at least one reason for the lack of
data is that TNCs have been unwilling to provide their accident reports for data
159
compilation purposes. To remedy this, Chapter 389 provides for the CPUC and
the California Department of Insurance to conduct a study so that the legislature
160
can revisit the required amount, if necessary.
After the study, the amount of insurance required is unlikely to equal the
161
amount taxis must carry, much to the taxi industry’s chagrin. The CPUC’s
decisions have made it clear that TNCs are inherently different from taxis, and

153. Meeting, supra note 48 (paraphrasing Sonja Palladino).
154. Press Release, Office of Assemblywoman Susan A. Bonilla, Assembly Woman Susan Bonilla, CA
App-Based Drivers, Parents of Sofia Liu, and Consumer Groups Urge Support of AB 2293 (June 25, 2014) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Assembly Member Susan Bonilla).
155. ACIC Letter, supra note 146.
156. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19.
157. Id.
158. See ACIC Letter, supra note 146 (theorizing that driving fast or looking at a phone is more
dangerous than transporting passengers).
159. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (recounting comments from Lyft’s Director of Public Policy);
Interview with Robert Herrell, Legislative Dir. and Deputy Comm’r, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., in Sacramento, Cal.
(June 11, 2014) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
160. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5436 (enacted by Chapter 389).
161. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (inferring from Assembly Member Susan Bonilla’s
comments that she will not seek 24/7 commercial insurance for TNCs).
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the legislature will not interfere with the CPUC’s findings, which have already
162
shown coverage can be significantly less than $750,000 prior to a match.
3. Commercial Insurance Requirement Properly Distributes Risk of TNC
Drivers
TNCs contend that the risks their drivers pose are not very high because onethird drive only five hours per week or fewer and most are employed outside of
163
TNC driving. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 389, TNC drivers used their
own personal insurance policies, but were sometimes driving for many more
164
hours per week than the average person. Insurance companies determine
personal automobile insurance rates through the creation of a “risk profile,”
which looks at the claims and activities of a large number of insurance customers
165
and then develops an average rate for a period of time. Insurance companies
did not predict the development of TNCs, so when they analyzed driver risks in
166
order to set their rates, commercial use of personal vehicles was not included.
Even though some TNC drivers may drive less than a non-TNC driver,
167
approximately 10 percent of TNC drivers make it their full-time job. The risk
profile of a driver only conducting personal business is different than one driving
168
tens of thousands of miles per year and earning money for doing so. Taxi
insurance is several times more expensive than personal insurance because taxi
drivers are on the road full-time, and therefore the risk profile of a taxi driver is
169
several times higher than a non-commercial driver. Although not all TNC
drivers are driving for significantly more hours than they did prior to working for
a TNC, those who do and submit claims on their personal insurance policies
effectively force all personal car insurance purchasers to subsidize their
170
activities. Requiring TNCs to provide commercial policies or the driver and
company to buy TNC-specific policies, shifts the risk of those drivers out of a
162. PUB. UTIL. § 5441 (enacted by Chapter 389); see also Decision, supra note 17 (creating a new
category of Transportation Charter Parties, a Transportation Network Company).
163. SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2293, at 2 (June 17, 2014) (using Lyft’s data).
164. See id. (acknowledging that only 10 percent of TNC drivers drive more than 30 hours per week).
165. See Risk Profile, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/riskprofile.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining a “risk profile” as an
analysis of a the number of potential risks, the types of risks likely presented, and the potential effects of these
risks).
166. Letter from Dave Jones, Ins. Comm’r, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., to Michael R. Peevey, President, Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm’n (Apr. 7, 2014), available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/video/0030VideoHearings/upload/CDICPUC20140407.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
167. SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2293, at 2 (June 17, 2014) (using Lyft’s data).
168. Meeting, supra note 48 (paraphrasing Robert Herrell).
169. Id. (referring to comments by Robert Herrell).
170. SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
2293, at 2 (June 17, 2014) (using Lyft’s data); ACIC Letter, supra note 146.
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pool of all individual drivers to a pool consisting of only commercial and TNC
171
drivers.
4. Supporters Address Further Concerns and Proposals of TNCs
During the development of Chapter 389, Assembly Member Bonilla worked
with stakeholders and incorporated appropriate solutions for TNC regulation into
172
the bill. The TNCs’ desire for self-regulation did not work for Chapter 389
supporters; they say the companies did not voluntarily fill the gaps in insurance
coverage when drivers logged on but had not been matched with a passenger
because the policy amounts were very low and the policies were excess, not
173
primary. One TNC’s voluntary, pre-match policy would have covered up to
$50,000 for bodily injury, but only if the driver’s personal insurance did not
174
provide coverage. Limiting pre-match insurance requirements to 50/100/30
coverage would not have helped Sophia Liu’s family, who suffered $500,000 in
175
medical bills and was the impetus for the legislation. Of course, even though
the additional $200,000 policy requirement will satisfy most injury claims, it
176
would still not have been enough to cover the Lius’ injuries.
Chapter 389’s sponsors found the assertion that personal policies generally
cover accidents when an app is on to be questionable and consequently they did
177
not want the legislation to rely on such policies. When personal policies did
pay claims made during TNC activities, it was likely done to mitigate the costs
178
and time of litigation. Supporters also felt it was inappropriate to make personal
policies cover activities outside of their scope and effectively ask the driving
179
public to subsidize TNC business expenses.
In response to TNCs’ belief that drivers may commit insurance fraud and
turn on their apps just to have coverage, Chapter 389 supporters point out that
171. See ACIC Letter, supra note 146 (requiring personal insurance policies to cover TNC drivers leads
to personal drivers subsidizing the commercial driving of TNCs).
172. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (discussing Assembly Member Bonilla’s negotiations).
173. Id. (citing comments from Kara Cross, General Counsel, Personal Insurance Federation of
California).
174. Stevenson, supra note 104.
175. Id. (citing the amount of the Liu family’s medical bills); 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19
(quoting Assembly Member Susan Bonilla).
176. Stevenson, supra note 104; interview with Robert Herrell, Legislative Dir. and Deputy Comm’r, Cal.
Dep’t of Ins., in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 10, 2014) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining
what extra insurance would cover). Approximately five percent of accidents result in injury claims of more than
$100,000, and two percent involve injury costs over $300,000. Ron Lieber, How to Know if You Have Enough
Auto Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/your-money/autoinsurance/how-to-know-if-you-have-enough-auto-insurance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
177. CDI REPORT, supra note 94, at 5.
178. Id. at 5.
179. Letter from Kara Cross, Gen. Counsel, Pers. Ins. Fed’n of Cal., to Michael Peevey, President, Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm’n (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter PIFC Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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180

there is actually a disincentive to do so. TNC apps evaluate drivers based on
their response times and how many fares they turn down; if one is driving
without intending to pick up a passenger and rejects ride requests, it will affect
181
his or her rating and subsequent business. Presumably, the TNC would also be
able to identify this ongoing behavior and ban a driver if lower rankings alone do
182
not effectively eliminate him or her. Further, the driver would be ill-advised to
try to use the commercial liability policy rather than his or her personal policy
because the TNC’s pre-match policy only compensates others for injuries and
183
damage, so it would not pay for repairs to the driver’s own vehicle.
5. Chapter 389 Sponsors’ Response to Taxi Industry Suggestions
Although Assembly Member Bonilla recognized the taxi industry’s concerns
regarding the lack of coverage when drivers pick up off-app passengers or turn
184
off their apps to rush to a popular area where they could earn higher fares, fulltime coverage would not have been appropriate because the drivers spend many
hours of personal time in their personal vehicles and livery coverage would be
185
excessive. The Legislature could have written Chapter 389 to examine profits
earned or miles driven to determine whether a specific driver is performing
services more like a taxi driver than a TNC driver and then require full-time
insurance for full-time drivers, but this would have complicated regulations and
186
increased work for insurance companies and TNCs. The legislature made it
clear that TNCs are inherently unlike taxi companies in rejecting other bills that
187
aimed to regulate TNCs like taxi companies. To regulate some, but not all,
TNC drivers as if they were taxi drivers would have contradicted this
188
sentiment.

180. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (highlighting comments from Kara Cross, General Counsel,
Personal Insurance Federation of California).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. CDI-CPUC Letter, supra note 22.
184. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (citing comments of Barry Korengold, President, San
Francisco Cab Drivers Association). Areas like entertainment districts and times like Friday and Saturday nights
are often subject to “surge pricing,” or increased fares. SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2293, at 5 (June 17, 2014). TNC drivers may speed or practice
unsafe driving in order to quickly get to these areas. Id.
185. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (inferring from Assembly Member Susan Bonilla’s comments
that she would not pursue 24/7 commercial insurance for TNCs).
186. Meeting, supra note 48 (citing comments by Robert Herrell evaluating when a driver is like a taxi
and what pickup requirements would be necessary).
187. 612 Energy Hearing, supra note 36.
188. See id. (ensuring removal of any TNC regulations contrary to the CPUC decision, which stated
TNCs were not charter-party carriers).
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6. The End Result of Chapter 389
Although it was difficult to set the amount of app-on, pre-match insurance
189
coverage, it was “important to err on the side of public safety.” Chapter 389’s
requirements strike a balance, protecting TNCs and their drivers without making
190
companies cover drivers’ personal activities.
Since the TNCs are concerned about their bottom lines, they can find a
solution to pass the costs on to customers, just as they do with $1 safety fees to
191
cover the costs of background checks. TNCs are also likely to impose the costs
192
of the insurance policies on their drivers. But there is, perhaps, enough of a
financial cushion for some of the companies so that they will not have to charge
193
customers more or make drivers buy their own policies. Uber’s value is
194
upwards of $18 billion, while Lyft is worth $700 million. Chapter 389’s
sponsors believe the compromise over the policy amount requirements will
195
ensure future innovations are not inhibited due to insurance costs.
D. Legislative Constraints Limited Chapter 389’s Provisions, but Future
Legislation or Regulations can Expand the Rules Governing TNCs
196

Chapter 389 treads new ground for the California legislature. Lawmakers
could have attempted to create rules for every aspect of TNCs, but instead tried
to balance matters that required legislative attention immediately with issues the
197
CPUC or legislature could handle in the future. As a result, there are a number
of proposed concepts that did not make it into Chapter 389, but have the potential
198
to become laws at a later time.
1. Addressing Fraud and Confusion
Future legislation could further reduce TNCs’ fears of app-on fraud by
imposing penalties for logging into an app without intent to provide TNC
189. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (quoting Senator Lou Correa).
190. Id.
191. Id. (referring to comments from Assembly Member Susan Bonilla, as well as Uber and Lyft
representatives).
192. Said, supra note 84.
193. See Hernandez, supra note 8 (hypothesizing that Uber is valued at $12 billion or more); see also
Rogowsky, supra note 81 (asserting that Uber has raised $1.2 billion in revenue).
194. Sam Frizell, Lyft Co-Founder: Uber’s Strategy to Contain Us Didn’t Work, TIME (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://time.com/3616382/lyft-co-founder-ubers-strategy/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
195. Press Release, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, California Legislature Approves
AB 2293: Bill Balances Consumer Protection and Responsible Innovation (Aug. 28, 2014) (http://www.pciaa.
net/LegTrack/web/NAIIPublications.nsf/lookupwebcontent/3845065E84C6855486257D43000808F) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
196. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Alex Padilla).
197. Id. (quoting Senator Alex Padilla).
198. Id.; 612 Energy Hearing, supra note 36; 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4.
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services. The problem, however, is that reporting and enforcing such penalties
200
could prove difficult. Turning the app on just to get insurance coverage is
already illegal because it is insurance fraud, but explicit codification would at
201
least remove doubt and discourage drivers from considering it.
Chapter 389’s requirement that a TNC must disclose the limitations of its
insurance policy only sets general standards for what the disclosure must
202
include.
This will help reduce driver confusion that existed prior to
203
enactment. Legislators could clarify this provision, however, by declaring a
TNC must warn its drivers that it will not provide coverage if the driver accepts a
204
street hail or a private client who contacted the driver directly. This would help
205
deter drivers from taking private clients when their apps are turned off.
2. Improving Access to TNCs for Disabled Riders
Disability advocates had hoped Chapter 389 would mandate accessibility in
206
TNC vehicles. The CPUC already requires each TNC to submit an accessibility
plan detailing how the apps will allow requests for accessible vehicles, how the
TNCs will secure wheelchair accessible vehicles, and other plans to increase
207
accessibility and combat discrimination. Some users, however, have reported
that TNC drivers discriminate against disabled users, such as refusing to transport
208
riders with service dogs. Legislators were open to a bill that would set access
209
mandates for TNCs but did not want to pursue them as part of Chapter 389.

199. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (expanding on insurance fraud comments of Armand Feliciano,
Vice President, Association of California Insurance Companies).
200. See Jon Brooks, Once Friendly Territory, California Looks to Toughen Rules for Uber, Lyft, NEWS
FIX (June 17, 2014), http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/06/17/2014/Uber-Lyft-Insurance-crack-down (referencing
Stuart Nelson, President, Point West Insurance, explaining how easy it would be to engage in fraud).
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 550 (West Supp. 2014).
202. PUB. UTIL. § 5432 (enacted by Chapter 389).
203. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (paraphrasing Assembly Member Susan Bonilla about
protecting drivers so they cannot “be sued for all of their personal property”); 612 Energy Hearing, supra note
36 (acknowledging the belief of several TNC drivers that they would have to buy more insurance).
204. CDI 2293 Memo, supra note 58.
205. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (quoting Mark Gruberg, Spokesperson, United Taxicab
Workers).
206. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (referring to comments from Sergio Alunan, former Taxi
Commissioner, City and County of San Francisco, and a spokesperson for the Taxi Paratransit Association of
California).
207. Required Reports TNCs Must Provide the CPUC, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.
gov/PUC/Enforcement/TNC/TNC+Required+Reports.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
208. Christina Farr, Uber Facing Probe in San Francisco Over Drivers Shunning Guide Dogs, REUTERS
(May 20, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/21/us-uber-blind-idUSKBN0E100J20140521
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (citing testimony from a
spokesperson for the Taxi Paratransit Association of California).
209. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (referring to comments by Senators Bill Monning and Ellen
Corbett).
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3. Assisting Airports with Enforcement
Airport managers have been trying to work with TNCs to ensure that drivers
210
are properly permitted to transport riders to and from airports. The CPUC has
211
given airports the power to handle TNC regulations on airport property, but
airports have made it clear they want legislation that requires commercial
insurance coverage for TNC drivers on airport property whether their apps are on
212
or off. The legislature could also require drivers to turn on their apps any time
213
they are at an airport.
Taxi and airport groups assert that TNC drivers are engaged in fraud that
214
Chapter 389 does not address. TNC drivers sometimes remove markings from
215
their cars, called “trade dress,” that identify their affiliations with TNCs.
“[c]oncealing the use of . . . vehicles for livery or commercial purposes . . . could
216
be considered fraud.” Even if it is not fraudulent, it makes enforcement more
difficult for entities like the San Francisco International Airport, which requires
217
TNC drivers to have permits to enter airport property. Legislation could require
permanent markings or mandate use of trade dress while at an airport, in order to
218
reduce issues of airport permit enforcement.
4. Providing Tools to Personal Insurance Companies
Several suggested additions to TNC regulations are related to accident
prevention and protocol when there is an accident, which would build off of
Chapter 389’s requirement to share app information during a claims
219
investigation. Because TNC drivers are using an app that could—if it does not
already—track their activities, safety advocates would like the apps to monitor

210. Lillian Kim, SFO Fed up with Ride-Sharing Companies, ABC 7 NEWS (May 16, 2014),
http://abc7news.com/travel/sfo-fed-up-with-ride-sharing-companies/64404/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
211. Decision, supra note 17.
212. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (referring to comments of Eva Cheong, Associate Deputy
Director, San Francisco International Airport, and Jim Lites, Executive Director, California Airports Council).
213. See id. (referring to a comment made by Don Gilbert, San Francisco International Airport
representative, that the current legislation isn’t a “perfect fix”).
214. TNC FACT SHEET, supra note 117.
215. Kim, supra note 210.
216. TNC FACT SHEET, supra note 117.
217. See 612 Energy Hearing, supra note 36 (interpreting comments from Senator Alex Padilla regarding
CHP enforcement); 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (referring to comments of Eva Cheong, Associate
Deputy Director, San Francisco International Airport).
218. 612 Energy Hearing, supra note 36 (referring to comments of Assembly Member Adrin Nazarian).
219. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5435 (enacted by Chapter 389); 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19
(reporting comments by Barry Broad, Legislative Representative, California Teamsters Public Affairs Council);
CDI 2293 Memo, supra note 58.
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the number of hours drivers are logged in and disable use of the app after a
220
certain number of hours in a day so that drivers are not fatigued.
To help eliminate finger-pointing when a TNC driver is in an accident,
legislation or regulations could require drivers to inform their personal insurance
221
companies that they are driving for TNCs. The TNCs could then require each
222
driver to submit proof of such a disclosure in order to provide services. Since
some drivers have reported that their insurance companies canceled their
coverage when they merely inquired about TNCs, any requirements should
223
include protections for the driver.
5. Improving Public Safety
Legislators have also discussed public disclosure of driver information, or at
224
least disclosure to law enforcement. TNCs could be required to submit their
background checks on their drivers to the CPUC or even post them on the
225
drivers’ app profile pages. Some would like airport police and the California
Highway Patrol to have access to TNC driver information so they can ensure the
226
driver registered on the app is the driver who they have pulled over.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 389’s final solution, which allows commercial car insurance to be
227
turned on and off, is “historic and unprecedented.” The parties who sponsored
this legislation feel closing the app gap with insurance requirements for TNCs is
228
a step in the right direction. Permitting TNCs and their drivers to meet Chapter
389 requirements with a combination of policies avoids deterring innovation for
229
both TNCs and the insurance industry. Insurance coverage requirements for the
most contested portion of Chapter 389, when the app is on but there is not a
driver-passenger match, reflect a middle ground between full-time, $1,000,000

220. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (indicating testimony by Barry Broad, Legislative
Representative, California Teamsters Public Affairs Council).
221. CDI 2293 Memo, supra note 58.
222. Id.
223. Meeting, supra note 48 (paraphrasing Chris Shultz).
224. 612 Energy Hearing, supra note 36.
225. Id. (quoting Senator Alex Padilla).
226. Id. (quoting Senator Alex Padilla).
227. 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (quoting Ted Pahos, Partner, Kester/Pahos).
228. See California Legislature Approves AB 2293: Bill Balances Consumer Protection and Responsible
Innovation, INSURANCENEWSNET.COM (Aug. 29, 2014), http://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/2014/08/29/
california-legislature-approves-ab-2293-bill-balances-consumer-protection-and-r-a-549662.html (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (characterizing the bill as one that protects the public through reasonable insurance
requirements).
229. PIFC Letter, supra note 179.
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primary coverage and a 15/30/5 policy, the minimum required for non230
commercial drivers.
Although Chapter 389 is only the first step in the legislative regulation of
231
TNCs, legislators are willing to revisit related issues in coming sessions. The
volume and variety of stakeholders’ suggestions show that the CPUC or
232
legislature could implement many more parameters for TNCs in the future. The
2017 completion of a report on appropriate coverage will further guide the
233
legislature to find solutions based on real TNC data.

230. See 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19 (discussing Assembly Member Bonilla’s negotiations).
231. 2293 Ins. Hearing, supra note 4 (referring to comments by Senators Bill Monning and Ellen
Corbett).
232. Id.; 2293 Energy Hearing, supra note 19; 612 Energy Hearing, supra note 36.
233. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5436 (enacted by Chapter 389); interview with Robert Herrell, Legislative
Dir. and Deputy Comm’r, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 10, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
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